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Dan O'Meara
* [l am grateful to Professor T. Dunbar Moodle of the
University of the Witwatersrand for generous access
to .his research material* My understanding of the
organisation has benefited from discussions with both
Professor Moodie and John Davies of Wisconsin Univer-
sity vhose research on Christian National Education
involves a close knowledge of the Broederbond.
Neither bears any responsibility for possible errors
of fact in this paper and both disagree with my
interpretation*]
i *We repeat the view we expressed a year ago - namely that the
Broederbond Is an arrogant, self-chosen elite, operating by
stealth and Intrigue, its early cultural aspirations swamped
by its neo-Fascist Ideas on race and colour* It is a cancerous
growth in the living body of South Africa and as such its
influence ie deadly*1 (I) •, "*"*""
,' . 'The Bond is a service organisation intended to serve the
;.' Afrikaner. Its sphere of operations Is the work of the
v. Afrikaner people as a separate historical, Prbtestant-
r- Christian language and cultural community. The activities
. with which the Bond occupies itself from time to time are
•« . determined by the needs of the Afrikaner people at that
historical moment.' (2)
:i1
 A secret society with the professed aim of the 'promotion of all the
interests of the Afrikaner nation1. (3) the Afrikaner Broederbond (hereafter
the A«B. or Bond) has long been the bogeyman of South African politics. Its
operations are attacked as detailed and lurid conspiracies, and defended as the
innocent, confidential actions of public-spirited men. In the process, though
much authoritative data on the Bond exists, its nature, functions and role have
been thoroughly mystified. At the outset it must be stated that the A.B. has
exerted a profound influence at all levels of South African politics. This
paper attempts the beginnings of a demystification of the Bond's operations and
an assessment'of its role up till 1946. Given Its secret nature, this is
necessarily sketchy and schematic. Yet such an assessment requires more than
ideological forma with those of the new capitalism. Yet at the very moment
that such accommodations were taking place, the preeminent agrarian formation
was both on the verge of collapse and of transformation. Nevertheless, the
political accommodation of the large landowners who had previously dominated
the social order of the Transvaal was perceived as necessary by the new
British colonial regime. This was both because of their continued capacity
to resist the new states incursion upon (or neglect of) their interests, and
because these landowners were seen as neoessary in containing the proletariat
emerging from within the white as well as the black peasantry. Although in
the past it was usual to assume that this accommodation inhibited the deve-
lopment of capitalism in South Africa, it seems more likely that its effects
were limited to determining which of the several paths this development might
take. i
The merchant capitalism which dominated the evolution of the agrarian (
relations of production in South Africa began in the form of the 17th and
18th century D.E.I.C. This company was intent on extracting commodities,
mainly cattle and to a lesser extent cereals and other crops end was not
concerned with tho circulation of goods. Moreover the indigenous societies
from which these goods v;cre to bo extracted were unwilling to exchange more
than a very limited number of their cattle. In this situation the raerchrjit
company extracted commodities by force and belov; the cost of reproduction
in numbers which wore beyond the capacity of the societies to reproduce
themselves. Because this was self-defeating this company permitted a
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colonial settlement intended to supplement production.
The size of tho market was, however, limited end prices offered by the
company were low. The se t t l e r households therefore turned in on themselves
and only sold as much as was needed to acquire the income for goods which f
t V.
were both socially necessary and could not be produced within the household.
Such households often maintained their income by loans union left them deeper
in debt. The company, therefore, found it necessary to provide a limited
number of settlers with an incentive to organise the flov; of goods for the
market. This led to the creation of a class of landowner-merchants. In
their turn these merchants presented an additional obstacle to households
without priviloged access to the market created by the company.
At the same time, a certain level of consumption was socially necessary.
This consumption included arms end ammunition because warfare was intrinsically
linked v;ith the evolution of the social formation. Squally consumption to
maintain certain cultural and material standards which in turn helped link
households to society vms r,lso necessary. Tho losr cf these cultural and
material links led men to be- doomed heathen and barbarian and placed outside
ox* those stratum of the society which could be given unimpeded access to
arms and amnunition. Impoverishment of this kind was however avoided by
tho customary dovico which evolved enabling households without cattle to be
sustained by those vrith~a sufficiency so long as they returned halT of the
Q
natural increase. This form of indebtedness created its own obligations
not the least being to provide military support. 'A little nearer the
frontier1 a well-known official wrote in 1813, 'the proprietor of a place
is mostly obliged to get several other farmers to live with him for mutual
protection against the savages and the nild beasts - bywoners, as they are
called.'9
This need for clients made it necessary for both cheaper and alternative
sources of income to be found. This income waa to oome primarily from
hunting and trading with autonomous peoples r.t c. distance. But they too
were unwilling to exchango more than a very small number of the sought-after
goods or to surrender rights over gone and their products. The result was
that trading and hunting were both infused with violence and the distinction
on tho one hand between trading and hunting expeditions, and on the other,
between the vjarbund, (tho commando) was primarily one of function. This
violence, when it was successful, produced not only booty or goods exchanged
below their value, but captives. Captives, most often women and children,
played an important part in the productive capacity of the settler (Boer)
households and wero expected to provide for their ov/n reproduction. In
the last quarter of the 18th century the capacity of settler households
to generate a surplus declined significantly as the inorer.se in stool: -
vjhich made their disposal even more difficult - combined the diminution
of ivory and other game products. This probably resulted in a more brutal
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attempt to force labour from captives than v:as tho case at any other time.
The capacity to organise violence was ultimately determined by tho
size of a patron's following and leadership wont to those with economic
pro-cminence. Forcnost acong these leaders v;ero the uorchant butchers of
Cape Town whose interests were linked to thy distyjt frontier zones and
•./ho therefore played a crucial military as well r,s economic and political
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role in maintaining the settler presence at the colonies periphery.
These leaders found the™.solves threatened in the early 19th century by the
British annexation v;hich brought in i ts train nev; murcantile groups and
ended existing mercantile monopolies. It also led tc a partial introduction
of new relationships of production and greatly undermined the ability of
Boer leaders to organiso autcnonous violence. These substantial alterations
in their social environment were conbined with an increasing inability of
tho settlers on tho periphery to sell their stock at any price. At the
sace tine a series of severe droughts in the first throe decades of the ;•
19th century replaced tho cycle of above average r^nfall of the last
At
quarter of the 18th century. The combination of all these factors led
sor.;e Boer leaders to attempt to withdrew from British political and economic
dominance in the hope that they r.ight reconstitute their social organisation
free of those forces which appeared to be undoruing their capacity to survive
In reconstituting their social structures in the Transvaal, Boer
leaders and their following set out to re-establish their previously
existing systems of appropriation and production. At the same time they
sought to establish a monopoly over trade, land and violence in the
territories to which they laid claim. It very soon became apparent that
specialised trading was beyond the resources of most Boer settlers. This
was in spite of the widespread attempts of Boer notables, in their dual
capacity as officials of the state and as traders, to use their powers to
limit entry to the market to members of *.heir own communities. In spite
of the harassment suffered by the early British and other foreign traders,
the credit fncilitios given thorn by tho coastal merchant houses, (and
which were not available to Boer trc-.ders), meant that they were able to
establish themselves at the expense of thoir local rivals. Once established,
a familiar process was set in motion, 'farmers were really forced to pay ,,
the firms with which they dealt in wool and hides v;hich were then forwarded ^
to tho coastal merchants who had supplied those firms. Farmers bought on
credit and paid in produce from time to time. They bought c,t extortionate
prices and sold their produce at the dealers own figure because their
produce was all they possessed with v;hich to settlo their liabilities.*
The Boer notables night try to break out of this cycle by printing
money but this made thorn more and not less vulnerable particularly ns tho
only backing for their currency was land. Both the debts of the state and
private individuals resulted in large tracts of land fo.lling into the hands
of absentee merchant landlords. The resolve to exclude foreigners from
owning land had, the-reforc, also failed and this was to have extremely
important consequences for determining the way in which the. surplus was to
be oxtraotod from the African population who were incorporated in this
newly created settler enclave. In many respects it can be argued that the v
Afrikaner settlers were worse off in the Transvaal because the cerchant
capital which dominated their oconop.ic lives had less interest in their
survival than the merchants of tho carlief Dutch period.
*
Violence, therefore, remained the Boer notables' greatest assot,
though their state was never to monopolise it at any time in the course
of its entire history. Violence was essential if appropriations from
other societies - in the form of captives, tribute or booty - were to be
nr.de. There was a circularity in their activities. Tho migrations of
the Boer communities had been made necessary because such appropriations
were becoming increasingly difficult. But the: .migrations had led to the
loss of clients and the impovorishnent of followjrj and therefore these
appropriations becane doubly necessary for their continued survival.
The relative importance of different forms of appropriation would
have to be measured against the different needs of the Boer communities
at different stages of their colonisation of tho interior. The carrying-
off of crops was of greatest importanoe while the migrations were still
taking place, or while the Boer colonists remained collected together as
little more than pastoral vrarbands. TheBQ colleotivities were also well
placed to engage in cattle raiding, Tho exaction of tribute acquired
greater significance as tho settlers began to disperse although tho
ability to call on the arned band remained essential to this form of
appropriation. 'The £1*J towns already exhausted of young men who had
gone to herd, were called upon to furnish 10, 20, 30 or k-0 won as tho case
required. Those were sent by the Veld Cornet3 and other officials hither
end thither to any man who had work to bo done ... At Rusteriburg we saw
25 women pass with their corn-sacks for food on their heeds to gather the
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Veld Cornets corn. Three Or.ys after they returned.1
The effect of being sent hither and thither mist have been to under-
mine the capacity of the tributary society to reproduce itself. This
relationship could not rcnain 3tablo .and vassal households must either
come to accept the obligations of labour for particular households in
return for its protection or have esco.pod frcn tho reaches of the Boer
communities. For a household to attempt to put itself beyond Boor exaotions
could prove disastrous and provide the occasion for the commando to be used
to seize cattle and then to compel those so impoverished into full tine
service with Boer households, '^ he alternative would bo for families to
accept tile protection of individual Boer households. This course was
encouraged by those r/ith tho nost substantial capacity for violence since
they afforded not only the most protection, but generally being the largest
V landowners, were nost likely to provide dependants with the nost substantial
access to grazing and arable land. PresumablyTne significant difference
between those who surrendered to the inevitable, and those who arrived a3
prisoners-of-war, devoid of property - often of family - was that the
former maintained control over some part of what they produced. In time
this control over some of their surplus product might give them new
strength with which to renegotiate their relationship with their landlords.
This suggests a significant difference between those two subordinate
groups. Nevertheless, there is a view which would have us describe them
all as dependents, all as clients. It may bo that the 'l?th century missionary
view that they v;ere slaves is unacceptable if bv that we mean that a slave
mode of production existed. Yet for the process *y which this particular
colonial system of exploitation was formed and reformed, notions of clientage
and dependence provide a loss than satisfactory vantage point from which
to viow the relationship which was established between captive and the
housohold to which ho or she was ultimately assigned. Captives bocome
pr.rt of Boer households, cither as prisoners-of-war, or r.s tho result of
being exchanged or sold into suoh households. In the 1Si*.0s they were
most likely to have been Boer prisoners-of-war, distributed by the commando.
By the I85O3 they were likely to have been sold by Boer traders, who might
have received them from Swazi notables in return for political favours.
By the 1860s Swazi-Boer transactions were straightforward commercial arrange-
ments. Such transactions, it is well known, were contrary to the constitutions
20
of the Boer republics. But more significant than the illegality of these
transactions was the acknowledgement which these constitutions made that
21
Boer society included African children detached from their families.
This formal acknowledgement was, of course, forcod upon the Boer settlements
by c. British colonial administration mostly concerned to have s, formula which
would serve both to placate anti-slcvery pressure groups in Britain, and to
provide legrJ. grounds for intervening in their affairs, should they choose
22to do so. It therefore denied the Boer states that legal code which is *,
generally necessary for a slave mode of production. It did not, on the
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other h?.nd, prevent captives from being inherited. Xmt v/ould Perhaps
be tempting to portiv.y tao bocial structure-s-which emerged as a stalled
slr.very created by the specific conditions of 19th century merchant capitalism.
But in the end we must recognise that slavery was only one of several labovr
systems to be found in the emigrant societies. It was, however, to be seen
with related forms of appropriation - the taking of booty and tribute. In
addition we should remember that from the 1850s members of African societies
periodically presented themselves for wage labour.
Captive children - r.nd young women - were in theory uncier the super-
vision of the st-r.te. They had to be registered - ingeboek - by an official,
end they were known as inbcoksclings rather than apprentices of the contem-
porary Jtngijnh dociw.onto.ticn. h Thct most inbocksolin»s wore children
stemmed from the fact that they presented little or no threat to the
security of the household, found it more difficult thc.n adults to escape
when first secured "by the household, and it became progressively more V
difficult to return to thoir place of origin cs^lhey grew older. All this
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added up to their dGrr.ciiiation. Their captivity or J^^ojcing was, according
to the law, for a limited period of time. Vomen were to be released at the
of.
ego of 21, men at the age cf 25. But there were no uechsinisms for setting
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captives free or for informing them that their captivity was over. Moreover,
as an added precaution, the c&tiLicte of the inbockseling1 s age at his
registration was likely to be much bolow his apparent age in order to ensure •
rxLcltioml yef.rs of service in the unlikely event of the apprentice claiming
to have served his time. 'The boy is evidently above fifteen years of r.ge1
a British official ncted of an apprentice in Republican Natal, 'and speaks
Dutch remarkably well. By underrating his r,gc, thpj' are, of course, enabled
to retain his compulsory service much longer.1 But in addition to having
no method for sotting tho "^^ o^ ii.sej^ Hig free, the laws of the Boer state
denied them tho right to be masterless. .Africr.r.3 who could not claim the
protection of a chief were obliged to accept whatever service was imposed
29
upon them.
As we have already noted there was a trade in captives and within Boer
sooiety there were specialise! dealers. For the most part the sale of
inboekselings was illegal but the lav/ (not to mention i t s administration)
was sufficiently imprecise to make i t s evasion commonplace. Evasion was
assisted by the distinction being made between veruilen which was i l legal ,
a n i
^ inruilen which was not. Exchange for profit (voruilen) wes i l legal ,
but if no more than reimbursement for. the keep of the oaptive was asked
this was defined as inruilen and permitted. It seems unlikely that the
different activities could always be distinguished. l-oreover, when a young
woman reached marriageable ago i t was neoessary for permission to be given
before she could be married and her suitor "had to pay for her either in cosh
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or cattle, or by providing labour.
If captives could be obtained by some form of barter the institutions
of captivity were nevertheless surrounded by laws which had the effect of
>:[ : limiting the number of captives within the society as a whole. Captives
could only be taken by official commandos and hunting and trading bands were
prohibited from doing so though again the law was ns likoly as not evaded.
Nevertheless i t v;a.s necessary to attempt to inhibit these unsanctioned
raids in order to prevent frccbooting expeditions provoking eitlier counter
raids or obstructions to legitimate trade raid hunting. While weak chiofdoms
or those at a great distance might bo attacked for captives, those who could
retaliate or provide important allie3 had to be treated with care.
Since the number of captivos, as well ca the age of those taken, was
limited by considerations of both internal and external security, their
distribution i7as of some importance. There i s evidence to show that the
notables of the Boer society, already men of substance, were likely to
rcccivo a disproportionate share of captives. Andries Pretorius, leader
/ - of the Voortrekker commando, which had defeated Dingane in 1838, had token
tight orphans for himself (but only registered *hem in his name three year3
later) , even though this early commando had cgrecd that, in order that the
children should be shared equally between the commando and other members
of the community, no more than two children should bo given to each emigrant,
One commando of Hondrik Fotgieter's returned with*little kaffirs as part
of i t s booty1. f0f these last1 Thomas Baines was told, 'Potgieter has,
according to Andrios, fifteen, and a Mr. Dcvenae not less than ten . . . All
who have been on commando have some . . . ' . The household of Ifertinus
Protorius r.cquired numbers of inboeksolings in 1854. Pretorius was no at
certainly engaged in the trading of captives in the 1860s. The German
missionary,/kichtigal, whoso evidence confirms ther^ acquisitions of theyounger Pretcrius, also reported that the Lydonburg l&n&Lrcst, H.T. Burhman,
had registered 16 children in his own name. His successor as landdrost,
C. Potgioter, registered children under his own nane on at least three
different occasions. Ono of the most persistent claims iw.de for the systora
v/as that the children v/oro only given to 'respectable men1.
8For those who would argue that the iriboeksellngs were not slaves, the
most telling argument is to be found in their life cycle. As adults, when
they had established their own families they became tenants of the dominant
household, obliged to provide labour, generally that of their own children,
for their tenancies. Yet it can be argued that this was no more than a
form of manumission which is an essential mechanism of social control and
which all slave-owning societies had to be able to offer. Most slave-
owning societies had to replenish their slave population from one generation
to another. For the relatively weak households of Boer society the trans-
formation of inboeksolings into clients - the so-called Oorlams kaffirs -
offered the best form of security. Although Oorlam families provided'labour
the need to replenish their households with new captives was therefore
necessary. The capacity of Boer society (end of its major trading partners,
the Swr.zi) to acquire captives was not consistent. By the 1870s and before ,
tho British annexation of 1877* the supply of captives had diminished
•significantly as African chiefdoms recuperated from their earlier position
of weakness. The parlous financial and military state of Boer society in
the years immediately before British intervention, which was probably
brought about by the decline of the ivory trade, can only have been aggravated
by the docreasing ability to obtain captives. Only after the British
annexation had brought with it the defeat of tho major enemies of the
republic - the Zulu and tho Podi - and then reformed the administrative
capacity of the S.A.R. was it able to engage on largo scale excursions which
resulted in large numbers of captives - probably more than ever before -
being taken. But this is to anticipate later events.
II
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If child captives wore preferred because their ago made escape diffioult,
this is not to claim that no inboekseling evor made such an escape. In the
1850s and 1860s thore was a continuous stream of run-av:ays. But osoape
from Boer society did not mean that they were able to extract themselves
from the new economic order or that they altered their subordinate position.
Valter Inglis who could rejoice at the cscapG of a captive could nevertheless
report, 'She is still in our service1. Somotimes escape from a Boor
household meant becoming an unwilling member of an African household.
This seems to havu been tho fate of the apprentice taozane, son of one of
Dinganos1 subordinate chiefs, Pheko, who escaped from the household of
Hermanus Steyn in -about 1852. Mozane or V&lentyn ^b he was known to the
bteyn household found that once he escaped he was hardly a free agent.
'He did not wish to go to his still living father Phcbo' he later told
the missionary - Nr.chtigal, 'as he had becomo usod to tho good life with
his master r.nd did not wish to return to the uncivilised kniTirs.'
Eventually he reached a group of 'Maferi kaffirs' but they provided no
haven and he seems to have been held captive once again. Even before he
reached the Maferi, Valentyn regretted hia action. Since he had to leave
his wife this was understandable, but his new insecurity led hin to reoall
Hermenus Steyn - with whom he had grown up - with some fondness. "Then,
therefore, he found himself on a trading expedition to Hosheshwe he took
advantage of a group of passing Boers and attached himself to their
expedition and eventually returned to the household in which he had been
raised. As Marc Bloch observed of medieval Europe, it was less difficult
to aocept a master than to live in fear of finding oneself without a
defender. Eventually Valentyn and his wifo, Lys, having 'come to God'
decided that their ohildren should be -edUofitod. To achieve this end they
proposed to go to Ratal because the Boers would not educate black children -
but before they set out they discovered that Nachtigal had recently
established a mission school and in January 1867 they moved on to the
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mission faro and enrolled their two eldest children.
For those who did not break av/ay from the Boor household, there was
as we have already notod, the prospect of the use of land for their own
production. Captive children, like other children of the household, had
been given a heifer when thoy first entered the household and this with
its increase meant that they were able to provide for the families which
they made. In sone respects captives became perpetual cadet members
of the dominant household. 'He is my child1 Andreas Pretorius had said
of his inboekseling which he acknowledged buying for eighty (riy) dollars,
Fretorius corrobor?,tion of the nature of the relationship was to be
L1
found in the contraband horse and a gun he had given the youth. To
the oxtent that the Boer household prospered so the inbockselings prospered.
Tributary households, however, nay have had a greater say in determining
the size of their surplus product if for no othoja-reason then that the
women of these households provided much less labcur to the dominant white
family. As late as 1393 an Anglican missionary working in the Fotchefstroom
district could write-: 'The- Graf re wonen who live on the farus with Boers
are not brought into contact with the Eoers or their womenfolk, and so
they do not learn to speak Dutch, cr to do white wonon1s work, such as
sewing and mending1. In addition, the necessary expenditure of the
inbookselings was much greater. They of ten lived in square mud brick
housos rather than in thatched huts and 'dressed like Europeans and had
food like Europeans, even to the drinking of early morning coffee1. More
.important their relationship with the dominant household and the tasks
they performed were markedly different fron those of other African house-
holds who now rented land from the white farrier rather than receiving it
from ft chief.
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and Lys, when they were r.bout to set off for Natal, bought
a wagon and they already possessed a team of oxen. Adults (or just adult
men?) had fev7er demands made of them by the dominant households. They
would it is true have been expected to go on the hunt but for r,ll its
hardships this was an event of great oonviviality for Boer men as well
as the inboekselings. Moreover, some commercial hunting parties were
made the sole responsibility of the apprentice. John Aylard, a pro-Boer
Irishman observed a class of African farm farailiss who had been fgroot
gemoacht* (made big) as a result of being brought up 'from childhood
amongst the families whom they now willingly served'. 'Husbands and
fathers1 Alyard wrote, 'had a bit of land and locations of their own on
the farms, and put in their off-time as wagon-drivers, ploughmen and
herds.' The women of theso families, ho wrote, did service in the land-
lord's house. 'I have gone into the huts of hundreds of families of r
these "tame" people, and have rarely suen one whore there was not a gun
and amaunition ready to be used, willingly and faithfully/ for the
defence of the flocks and herds of the maligned Boor. These folk, or
"maacht volk" (sic) ns they were usually called,were perfectly free to
cone and go,' It v/as not simply that the OorlamsjCoJTer defended the
flocks against wild cnimcls and rustlers, but ultimately they acted as
armed supervisors, scrutinising the herding activities of migrant workers
who were periodically employed and who could not be relied upon. As
important they served in a variety of capacities on commandos and . unlike
Africans in households which survived continuously through the Boer
occupation of their territory, they played a part in Boer resistance
during tho South .African "war of 1899-1902. TYhilc the Oojrlans Kaffers -.
sustained Boer guerillas in the field, other African tenants, the plakkers -
or squatters, resisted the Boer connandos and helped limit their capacity ^
for resistance by driving off their cattle and denying access to foodstuffs
and to the cover which their regions provided.
Ill
By the early 1870s, at much the sc.ee time that African chiefdom3
reasserted themselves, and as the flow of captives PJMI ivory declined,
a growth of now markets took place. Potentially the households of the
western Transvaal could benefit from the Griqualand Vx-st diamond fields,
r.nd tho goldfields of Pilgrims Rest, Lydenburg and Barberton offered
similar opportunities to the households of tho er°torn Transvaal. Theso
markets required increasing amounts of foodstuff, both arable as well as
pastoral production. But for an increase in arable production there would
have to bo r, change in tho kind of lr,bour which w?.s set to work. Child
labour, though it continued to be of value in herding c.ttle and domestic
work,could not be usod in the r.\orc arduous tasks of agriculture. There
11
had, of course, always been supplementary sources of labour available for
some seasonal activities and we have already pointed to the existance of
tribute as well as migrant labour. In addition men and women from ;
autonomous African societies had come to do such tasks as build dams,
thatch roofs, dig irrigation ditches in addition to wooding and harvesting
crops. Mrs. Hereford was told in 1877 that it was possiblo to get labour
for i/6d a day in the fc'agaliosbarg area. Her own experience, however,
suggests that adult male labour was more expensive,. She had be eh asked
2/- a day plus three meat meals but this may have been both because the
element of immediate coercion was absent in her negotiations and that
times were unsettled politically. Women employed in harvesting were paid
loss.
•Parties of Kaffir girls1 she wrote, 'usod to come from
a- different kraals, some thirty miles distant, to pull the
(•""" fruit and spread it on things made of wood and roods, called
stellGells, that looked like stretchers. Each girl would
bring a large conical shaped basket on her head; into this
she would put the fruit, and she expected to bo allowed to
fill it once for her own benefit as payment.1
If the new mining districts created a potential market for agricultural
products it also created an actual market for labour. The seasonal labour
sent out from the independent chiefdoms - and as we shall see from the
mission stations - now mado its way to the mining camps where wages wore
not only higher but whore that most important of comnodities, ammunition
and rifles, wore to be purchased. Unable to compete with the labour
oarket Boer households had to find alternative ways of obtaining labour.
The most common alternative had always been to extend the area in which
coercion could be usod tc set labour to work. This extension must coue
either by an increasing hold over new territory or by extending the sway
v. : of individual households by increasing rent or tribute from groups pJLready
falling within their orbit. But as we have already suggested the :
chiefdons were v,.gaining lost strength, and the some was probably true
for individual households caught by thG oarlier tributary relationship.
VThere these relationships had been transformed into tenancies with an
obligation to provide labour, the new narket conditions of the 1870s were
likely to impose strains upon such relationships. Thus at one and the
same time that there was a need to increase the amount of labour available,
there was a continuing need to defend and maintain the existing writ of
the Boer household find there was, therefore, an ebb and flow of political-
cun-economic power.
I-iepublican law nay have forbidden Boer households from establishing
themselves in the vicinity of African homesteads, but the breach of such
1 O
law was probaLly connonplr.ee. A process of encroachcent by degrees
then followed. To begin with peruission for seasonal grazing was obtained.
Continuous occupation was then construed as the granting of ownership and
this v.'tis then enforced by the arucd support of nobilo neighbours. They
12
in turn would be given the support of the state by the involvement of
the most important neighbour, the veldkornet. The Boer squatter
turned landlord then used such power as he could call upon to force
neighbouring .African households to provide labour or face the prospect
of being forced off the land. Men and boys might be given a small cash
payment when commandeered for harvesting, but women, who could be
ordered to weed or 'scoffle' were given a basket of peaches when fruit
was ripe but nothing o.t other times. Since these families continued to
work their own land confliot was likely, particularly if the landlord
uanted the tenant's services at the same moment that the tenant wished
to work his own land. On one such occasion a Boer squatter, called
'Do'Kruger (possibly Doss Kruger, Paul Kruger1 s brother), called on his
new-found 'tenants' to allow irrigation water to be channelled on to
his land, but he complained the kaffirs persisted in spending their
time letting i t on theirs. Kruger having decided to 'make an example' V
of one or other of these tenants called his Boer neighbours together
and then rode to the African homesteads. Only one of the adult
tenants responded to the arrival of this Boer force and he was ordered
to channel irrigation wf.ter on to Kruger's land. Then we are told:
'The Kaffir replied that he would do so after he had
watered his own . . . Upon this the Boers leapt off their horses
and made a rush for the hut, forced their way in, overturning
a small child, and seized the man who was particularly obnoxious
to them; but just as Do entered the house a man of the name of
Manell hit him over the head with a stick with a heavy knob at
the end . . . '
In this way Do Kruger met an untimely end.
This incident took place in the western Trfinsvaal just before
the British annexation in 1877 o^ d i t was probably unusual only in
i ts leading to the decth of the luidlord. Elsewhere ft this time, v
there are reports of chiefdoms reasserting "themselves and ordering
farmers to le.".ve land which they were noiv reclaiming cs their own.
From the Harts River area in the west, Iydenberg in the east wid the
ioutansberg in the north there vxe reports of people seizing lend
occupied by Boers and ploughing and sowing on them themselves.
President Thomas Burgers complained thct he was £sked to release Boer
trocpoyers from their obligations because they had been driven off
their farms by the surrounding Africans. To this he might have added
that on the fringes of Boer society where i t s writ did not run, some '.
Boer households retrained their lr,nd only by paying tribute to the
local chiefs. 'The Boers themselves live in the distr ict on sufferance.'
a missionary in the Northern Transvaal had written, 'Instead of the
Kaffirs paying taxes, the frxmers pay blackmail to them.' A similar
process had been observed by Sir Gar-net irolsey when he wrote 'now that
the Native possesses a gun as ^vell as Meinheor, the lat ter being no
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longer able to shoot him dovm with impunity, he is even beginning to
recognise a master in the blackman. This is shown by the number of Boers
who in recent years have been paying tnxes to Native Chiefs in consideration
of being protected by them*. In several distr icts the Government was
powerless to help those who gave i t their allegiance and when they complained
to Pretoria of stock thefts they were told to seek the good offices of the
local chief.51
The British annexation of the Transvaal probably halted this prooess
:md loft the central state stronger than i t had ever been. I t acquired a
new capacity to raise taxes which gave i t a military capability which i t
had previously lacked. At the some time Britain's intervention in Southern
Africa also led to the defeat of the Zulu and Pedi, both of whom had
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constrained and threatened the S.A. republic throughout i ts existence.
Freed of these two major enemies the Boers could successfully embark upon
a series of major campaigns - against the Mapoch in 1883, the Malaboch in
1894 and the Venda in 1898 - which enabled the South African Republic to
claim and reclaim new land and dependent Ir.bour. But military victory and
the capacity to set defeated people to work *?re substantially different
processes. This is most effectively demonstrated in the- case of the Mapoch
people. The Mapoch r.'ho had defeated the Boers in the 1850s -.?ere again drawn
into .?. war with the republic because of i t s -new-found administrative zeal.
Intent on establishing the boundaries of the Mapoch chiefdora, the Native
Location Commission had surveyed their land. The subordinate status which
this implied wrs rejected by the Mapoch who destroyed the be<icons and .
refused to accept Boer tax collectors. In addition they •sould not give up
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a fugitive whom the Boers were demanding from them. This led to a war
which lasted nine months and cost the republican treasury £30,000. That
i t could afford so expensive a venture wr.s a measure of the British
administration's reforms because prior to i t s annexation the republic had
been al l but bankrupt. Having defeated the Mapoch i t was decided that the
security of the state required that they should forfeit their land and that
they be dispersed throughout the state. The Mapoch - between 8,000 and
10,000 women and children - were to be indentured though as e. precaution
against British intervention i t wrs now official policy that families were
not to be bruken up. These families were to go to the Boers who had served
on the commando and those who had no black families already in their home-
steads were to be given preference. The indenture was to be for five years
and the family wr.s to receive up to £3.00 a yer.r in fool, clothing and cash.
The exact amount they were to receive was to be determined by the Native
Commissioner of the district. The families were in addition to gr.y those
taxes for which they were deemed to be in arrears c.a well as e fine of £5-00
55for their having rebelled against lawful authority.
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These conditions, had they .been fu l f i l l ed , must cer ta inly have, amounted
to a form of peonage and the Bri t ish High Commissioner suggested that the
indenture be limited to one year. The advice of his subordinate in the
Transvaal was thnt there w;".s no need to intervene since i t was unlikely
that aay indenture would lr.st longer than twelve months. T.lthin weeks he
t»as reporting cases of desertion coupled with an inab i l i ty on the par t cf
the s ta te to prevent these desert ions. There seems to h*?.ve been a. general
resignation to the fact thnt the s ta te possessed no means to follow up and
recover runaways. If they were reported at a l l i t w.'.s because the Boers
tc whom they h&d been indentured had made themselves responsible fcr the
collecting of taxes end fines anl wure now making sure that they r i d them-
selves of the responsibil i ty. The Map bah case was not, however, exceptional. -
In 1898 the Gold Fields Ne-.?s reported that families were being rounded up
by the notorious Native Commissioner fcr Lydenburg, ,'.bel Erasmus. The
Gold Fifclis He::s drevr on the revert cf an African informant named Gobela V
who claimed that he and his three wives and seven children had been rounded
up after the i r homestead had been destroyed anl the i r poultry ki l lod and
their grain burnt. Together with ether families they had been sent to a
frxm near iir.ch/.-:Ladorp from -.vhere they h'vt been divided among lecal farmers.
' I went with my family to one Fl.ick, a Boer l iving a t the head of the
Crocodile Valley. He paid us no wages during the two and a half months
thnt we worked for him. Then we ran away, and i t i s three and a half
57months since then. '
The Mapixjh saga had, however, a more dramatic conclusion, ^nether
attempt to inlenture Mapoch prisoners-of-war was made and th i s turned out
to be more successful. Even 30 the Str.nd-.rd and Diggers NQ-TS carried this
s tar t l ing paragraph in March 1892:
1
 The continued disappearance of the Mapoch Kaffirs who were
apprenticed out three years, ago after the war i s causing grave
fears in government c i r c l e s . The Superintendent of Natives says
that never in the course of h i s whole l i f e has he oome across a
case so remarkable. Thousands of Kaffirs have disappeared from
service within the l e s t two months, and although he has given
urgent instructions t6 a l l f i e ld cornets and commissioners to
find out where the natives go, no trace has been discovered of
them. Native spies are being employed a l l over the country, but
a l l traces of the vanishing Kaffirs are los t . 1 58
There was, of course, nothing mysterious about 'vanishing Kaff i r s ' . As
dispossessed peasants the Mapoch, and others l ike them, would seek to
escape from a service which they entered unwillingly. Unlike the captives
of ear l ie r decades, the return to a pre-conquest economy was not neces-
sari ly an exchange of one dependent relationship for enother of identical
dimensions. The collective resources of a family would sustain them and
give them greater resources in a dependent relat ionship. On the other
hand the effeots of conquest,though they might be al tered, were v i r tua l ly
impossible to reverse, par t icular ly as the chiefdoms were, by the end of
tho 19th century, suffering from a shortage of land. ° The alternative
at this time was to find a new landlord, who would offer a different
relationship which entailed more then, different treatment.
There were three different whit© landowning groups in the Transvaal,
each deriving their claim - though in different dcgrGos - for their
property from the state of the South African Republic. Accordingly the
expropriations of the peasants' surplus product differed from one group
to another. The three different landowners wero the Boor households,
the land companies and the missionary societies. Boer households did
not reproduce a single relationship for the appropriation of the
peasants1 surplus product because Boer society was itself stratified.
Those with the large landholdings sot peasants to work in a way which ..
differed from those with a limited amount of land. (By the 1880s Boer
society included in addition to peasants with tenant holdings an increasing
number of Afrikaners without access to land.) The strategy employed by
largo landowners was to accommodate r,s large a number of tenants as was
possible. One clear purpose in accumulating large landholdings was to
limit the direct demands which were ir^ de on those who were given access
to land. Some members of 0. peo.sant household might have to work for their
landlord but, we are told, the work was not 'oppressive1. 'For this
ploughing, sowing and harvesting, the chief labour, they have each lands
assigned them sufficient to support their fanilies in their simple wants,
r.nd abundance of tine for themselves ... and tho natives are not bound
to tho soil ... The Boers arc obliged in self-defence to treat their
people leniently,1
V:hen c landlord rented land to a white faraor, ho only did so on
conditions that he 'retained the right to Kaffirs living there'. Tho
\ •• lo.bour produced from such tenancies was meagre. For example, the Native
Commissioner in tho Eastern Transvaal reported that one landlord with
forty tenant fanilies could only call upon the full tiuc services of
threo young ncn, while another twenty nen provided two nonths' servioe.
Johannes Hissik, sonetiuo Surveyor-General of the S.A.R,, director of
the Transvaal Lend and Exploration Company and the future Minister of
Lands in Louis Botha's first government, was reported to have 100 fanilies
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on his faru. Louis Botha told the 1903 Transvaal Labour Comnission that
before the South African \;"ar he was 'usually' able to call upon the labour
of 30 to 35 Ben. The Native Commissioner for the Central Division of
 ;
the Transvaal* H.V. Taberer/&ivision included Pretoria, Kenans Kraal and
Heidelberg), told the sine post-war commission that he thought the white-
owned farms in his district had double the number of adult men that they
required. Tenants of large landlords i
provide a cash as well r.s a labour rent.
might, however, be called on to
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"The najority of fnrnors that have three, four or
five fanilies on their tarns make an agreement with these
natives the day they take then, that they will plough such
and such a piece of ground with their own oxen, or have it
ploughed for then, and besides that they could have ploughed
as much .is they like, but for that the native nust then give
three of four of his children- to the farner to work for hia
and perhaps one or two of the other men to look after tho
cattle. You nust understand th.%t if a nativo gets a farn by
paying say £15 r. yoar, he nakes perhaps £30, £40 or £50 out
of the farn for thr.t year. The natives have seen that it is
nuch better for then to renain on the farn under these
conditions rather than work for £1-10s per nonth.'°5
Alternatively, landlords night connute their tenants' services in
return for going to work on the goldmines. Although Tabcrer clained that
the ftL.ri?.s in his district had double the number of non required for
agricultural purposes, he also acknowledged that alnost half of these
had worked on the golduines in the previous year. Tha landlord then ( '
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received, instead of labour or cash rent, a reoruiting fee.
It is a feature of landlord-tenant relationships in this period -
unlike the 1920s and 19303 - that relatively dense sottlenent did not
autonntically denote a connunity of the inpoverished. On the contrary,
it was because the landowner or occupier with a limited amount ov land
who, bocause ho needed all the labour time he could get fron such tenants
as he had, was forced to impose a rigorous regine on those who worked for
hin. Vith a limited raount of land and therefore with a sr,all nur.bor of
labour-tenants, the snail f.?.rr.ar had to set his tenants to work at nore
regular intervals. Tho resulting drudgery would not only be unbearable
but it would reduce the por.sants1 surplus product substantially. 'I do
not think their masters would put up with the nr.tivcs growing rich off
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their lands when they thenselvos noke no progress.1 ^
Nevortheless, such households were not reduced to uere subsistence.
In the late 1880s, in the south-western Transvaal, in tho vicinity of
PotchefstrooD, an area 'dotted over v;ith J^ utch f^rcs on nany of which
there (wore) hanlets of natives/ , labour tenants sustained an autononous
social life. Sonetines those labour-tenants were associated with established
Christian sects, sometinos they were led by 'self-taught and self-supporting1
evangelists. Sone of thoso evr-ngelists accepted a role within tho Anglican
Church and called ther.solvcs 'foremen^ But if they acted as internediaries -
one of these was a nan naned Christian Pretorius v;ho was probably a forner
inboekseling - they did net surrender their wish to ler.d their own following.
A white cleric corplained that these evr-ngelists folt that 'the Church
belonged to then and the nissiomry must be subserv.innt to their will1.
Christian and non-Christian tenants continued to live side by side.
Families living in these 'hanlets' owned cattle, ploughs and sor.etiues
wagons and draft ariinnls. Tha Christians anong their number v;ere beginning
to have new expenditure's not only for education but for such events as
weddings, v.e get sono inlcling of the surplus product of these labour-tenants
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fron the buildings they constructed. Those were used as chapels, schools
end in general as rioeting houses to whioh people co.no fron niles around.
Just after the South African ^ xir the tiissionary Edwin Farmer reported 15
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such buildings in his district but they were also observed before the war.
The drudgery imposed by the Boer farcer with c. limited (mount of land
and the United surplus production that could b£ allowed the black labour-
tenant l.eant that the snail former was always in danger of losing his labour-
tenants to the largo landowners. The snail settler faruer was always hard-
pressed to find labour apart fron innediate kin. It v.'o.s to snail
fanners that the Mapocb fanilies wero indentured and it was fron then that
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they fled. There was in the lest twenty years of the 1 9th century nuoh
lamenting that Afrikaner children and wonen had to be enployed on such
arduous tasks as ploughing and harvesting as well as ninding stock. The
inability of those fanilies to acquire labour contributed in no sroall way
to their fr.ilure to survive as economic entities. As for the black peasant
families who sought refuge on large ferns, it nust often have been the case
in these two decades that they were r.ble to determine how nuoh they would
produce with relatively little interference fron their landlord. Moreover,
the peasant household usually sent only its adolescent sons to work for the
landlord. This neant thr.t the physically strongost combers of the family
wero not working for the white f.?.mer and, in addition, those who did cone
to work had little or no experience of the techniques or disciplines of
labour. When we c.<?.d to theso difficulties the special problems of the
'pioneer' settlor, then we cay nove sone way tovr.r&s explaining the low
productivity cf white agriculture c,t this tine. In nany cases farmers were
unable to cennunicate sinple instructions to their workers. '/cj7ne of the .
peculiar difficulties cf the life1, one English settler wrote, 'was that of
V- having to explain to cy I'ative servants all the work thr.t had had to be
done in a language that I had not learnt. This was a great handicap. I
could never give an ordor quickly —in fact, I could not give an order at
all very often becauso I did not know the words-in which to give it.1
»
The paradox which, thorcfore, energes fron Oivon Thomas' report where
on the one hand he • berates tho African as a farr.; labourer - 'the Kaffir is
a bad third' - yet on tho other hand he acknowledges 'the T'affir as the
best and wisest cultivator of tho soil in South Africa1 cones to be seen
an unreal.
The large landlord ha*! another advr-nta&c when it cane to acquiring
labour. Because of their relative; wealth they wero often local, office
holders. In their capr.cityas veld kornet, connanOfirt or native connissioner
they had in the past been able to use compulsion to txtrr.ct labour fron
peasants in their districts and they continued to receive this labour
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service free the followers of chiefs and missionaries. Such labour was
provided in order to naintain cordial relations with thesj officials.
Equally their office gave Boer notables tho best access to lend and this
18
more often than not meant proximity to land occupied under eome form «f
communal tenure. The advantage gained from this proximity was that it
ensured that those who went abroad .to look for additional income would be
induced, at least for G time, to work on the landowner's farm.' But .
offioials benefitted in another toid far more important way from their office.
They were tax collectors. From their earliest settlement Boer communities
had •laimed the right to taii people they found themselves amongst, but
their claim was rarely made good. In 1870 the Volksrrad had decided that
a hut tax wns t» be paid by all Africans in the republic. It would be
2/6d for those living on a farm but providing labour for the Boer household,
5/- for those who provided labour but did not live on a white-owned farm
and 10/- for those who provided no labour at all. This was emended in 1876.
The distinction was now made between great locations, that is land occupied
independently of white landlords, and smr.ll locations, which was lend held f
from landlords. Those on great locations were required to pay 10/- for
every inhabited hut rind 10/- for every adult over twenty years of age.
Those on small locations had to pay 5/- per hut and 1/- for every male
over 20 years of age but anyone working for a white farmer was exempted
79from paying tax. In practice, tax collecting was sporadic and arbitrary
and took the form of expeditions which seized cattle v;hen cash v;as not
immediately cade available (and possibly even when it wr.s offered). The
cattle were then grossly undervalued and the tax-collector took the difference
between what was realised on the cattle and the tax which was sent on to the
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central authority. The activities of the tax-collectors (and the traders
v/ho followed in their wake) was observed at various times between the 1870s
find the 1890s. It was graphically described by David lAcKay Y.'ilson, an
official in the mining town of Barbeton, who reported the methods of the ,
Land&rost of Lydenburg, Abel Erasmus; ^,
•He v/ould arrive unexpectedly in a Kaffir kraal, and demand
payment of hut tax, ten shillings for each hut. Now, a kaffir1 s
bank is always some secret hiding place, to which he goes only
at night, or when certain thr.t he is unobserved; so when suddenly
called upon to produce his half sovereign he would ask time to
obtain it. This was just what Erasmus wanted. The required
delay would be peremptorily refused, and the oscort ordered to
seize an ox or 0. cow. It v.-as in vein that the Itoffir; 'pleaded
for even an hour's delay. I have seen them bring the monoy
within an hour or two of the seizure. Erasmus refused to accept
the tender. The ox, worth £5 on average, v/ould be driven to the
commissioner's farm, with perhaps fifty others similarly escorted,
r.nd ten shillings per hoed may have boen remitted to Pretoria. '81
The depredations of the tax-collector could bn avoided by Having cash
always available in case ho called. But having the cash availablo was not
necessarily going to prevent livestock being plundered. The tax-exemption
which '.-His offered to those cultivators who accepted land on a Boer farm and
provided labour in return is best understood as a method of fending off the
raids. Accepting lend from a white farmer was one means of acquiring protection
against arbitrary end rapacious tax raids. In return for providing protection
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the poasnnt family committed itself to providing labour or earning the
recruiting fee by going to 7/ork on the mines.
Tho absentee landlord and the land company offered an alternative to
tenancies on Boer farms. The advantage for tho tenant was that while
protection was afforded the tenant, the landlord, at least to begin with,
rarely intervened in determining production. Tonants could have a greater
autonomy in deciding on the extent to which their marketable surplus produot
should exceed tho needs of rent and taxation. The amount and form whioh
rent took varied both from distriot to district, and from one period to
another. To begin with, the collection of rent was extremely difficult.
It is doubtful whether absentee landlords were able to collect much rent
before 1880 and for more than a decade after that dato there were companies
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who complained that they coulcl not get access to thoir land. Rents night
/:•. be as little as 10/- per person per year and 5/- for grazing and water; It
might be £1 per household per year, or as the capacity for collecting rent
increased so the rent might increase to £1 for oach wife. If the land was
close to markets rent would bo paid in kind as well as in cash, and cash
rents wero much higher, sometimes being as nuch as £10 per household or even
8Lfor every adult male in the decade before 1900. within the soue district
the landlord might require ;-, fixed amount of produce, for example, 25 bags
or ho oight demand o, share of tho crops. The advantage- to the male tenant
was that the landlord rarely interfered with his social relationships.
There was no missionary to forbid polygaEjy, no landlord to prohibit beer
drinking. The constant theme of white faraors1 petitions nay be reduced to
this single but often hoard theme: 'These natives are not under supervision
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and do exactly as they like'.
Within the Land Conpany sector a wholo range of productive relationships
existed. At one pole a sinplc redistributive economy was maintained.. Then
there were the leases taken by 0. headman who acquired woalthy in his own
right while calling on his followers to provide him with communal services.
At the other extreme the Lewis and Karks Conpany, whose activities were, cf "
course, not United to being rentiers, (and possibly for this reason) and
whose activities were entirely South African based, helped their tenants to
acquire better faming equipnent and seed contributing to their greater
productivity. In between these two extremes was the peasant entrepreneur
who enraged his white competitors by being able to call on labour in a way
which, for both economic and cultural reasons, they could not compete.
'For the last two seasons', thoir complaint read, 'this native has reaped
ovor 300 bags of ncclics and Kaffir corn. He pays r. rent :f £10 per annum
and has all his cultivation clone by beer drinkers. This is of course a
hopolcss state of .-\ffairs for tho white rnan to try and compete against.1
If, to begin with, land companies complained that they could not get
access to their lp.nd, or that their tenants would not pay their rent,
those with associations with tho mining conpanies were, by the end of tho
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19th century, able to extraot an additional obligation from their tenants.
In return for rights to land they were required to work for the mines.
'As I explained to you 1, Sammy Marks wrote to Lagden, 'one . ..
of the conditions upon which these natives are allowed to settle
on our land is that, when not employed in agricultural pursuits,
the able-bodied men are obliged to work in our coal mines, a few
elderly men always remaining behind to keep order in the settle-
ments, to look after the families and to superintend the work
necessary to be done on the landsi1 • .. •
The most interesting records which have so far come to hand are"
those of the Vereening Estates and Land Company (VELC) owned by the Lewis
and Marks group. The .Company owned 15 farms in the Transvaal and Orange
Free State on opposite banks of the Vaal River. The estate manager of the :
Company, I.M. Kok, prepared a Tenants Census and Report in 1903 at the
request of Sir Godfrey Lagden. Kok's report suggests an intense degree f
of cultivation amongst both its white and bXack tenants. The black tenants,
who were 'allowed to take as much ground as they pleased and to cultivate it
89in their own way' and 'according to their own ideas', including 240 adult
men, 276 adult women, 140 boys and 183 girls over the age of twelve. In
addition, there were 700 children under the age of tvrelvo living on the
VELC farms. Of the 219 married tenants 22 had two wives, three had five
but the majority had only one wife* In return for access to land 380
males over the age of twelve worked on the mines and plantations of the
Company. In addition, sixty men who were either in poor health or too old
to work also lived on the VELC farms. The able-bodied men were away from
the land except for periods when ploughing had to be done. This meant that
the women and girls and young ohildren played a crucial part in the cultivation
of crops. Planting, weeding and the picking of crops were left to them. f
In addition, white tenants who had relatively small households, probably
employed some of the women and children on the land they rented from the
company.
In December 1903 the VELC farms had 20,506 acres under cult ivation in
the two ex-republics. White tenants and t he i r families - in a l l , 105 men,
women and ohildren - cultivated 3,210 acres . Black tenants cultivated 16,296
aores. These black tenants had 10,400 acres under maize. This required
520 bags of seed and cost £623- The cost of the seed was advanced to the
tenants by the Company. At the sasae time white tenants planted 135 "bags of
maize seed on 2,7^5 acres and the seed, also an advance from the Company,
cost £147- The Company had anticipated that the i r tenants ' maize crop would
to ta l 39,500 (200 lb . ) bags in 1903 but the drought of the growing season led
them to conclude that actual yields would be lower. Assuming that the i r
estimates were, therefore, a third too high (although farms on the Vaal would
be able to have some land i r r igated) and that f ive-sixths of a l l production
came from African tenants v?ho received the very low price of 7/6d a bag, then
thei r gross income Jroni maize was approximately £8,500. Since rent accounted
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for a half share, black tensnta might l»e oxpo^lad to resolve at loast £4,000 on their
maize crop which would have been almost enough to pay off their debts on their cattle
purchases. In addition most of the kaffir corn planted that year came from African
production on the farms. Black tenants planted 5892 acres while white tenants
limited their production to 324 acres. The company anticipated 24,864 bags of sorghun -
being produced but again allowances had to be made for the drought. Even so income
90fromsorghuu would not have been insubstantial.
Production on the company's farms had increased substantially in the short while
between 1897 and 1903. In 1897 the number of black heads of household was 114. This
rose to 152 the next year and had increased to 219 by 1903- In 1897 and 1898 the
combined production of maize and kaffir corn was approximately 12,000 bags. By 1903
anticipated production was five times as high. Black tenants owned 174 ploughs in
1903 and of these 61 had been purchased that year with loans from the company, (£334)
In addition 400 of the 1369 cattle owned by black tenants were draught animals needed
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for ploughing and for taking the waggons to market.
Since land companies recdved both rent and labour from its black tenants it is not
surprising that they preferred them to certain groups of white tenants. But this
preference would have existed even if black tenants had not accepted the obligations to
work in gold mines as part of the conditions of their tenancies. Those whites excluded
fron the possibility of tenancies were generally poorer and landless Afrikaners. They
were more likely to graze cattle extensively - that is where cattle survived - and unlike
black tenants they were not subjected to extra economic coercion, ani therefore less likely
to have adopted cash crops. The pattern of relatively close settlement vtiich black
tenants were willing to accept meant that even though the rents of individual black house-
holds were low, their combined rent for the area they occupied was greater than could be
obtained from the smaller number of white tenants farming the same eosrage. 'No
jrtiite tenant is prepared to pay a rental equal to what is secured from a farm upon which
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fifty to a hundred native families are squatting,1 Similarly, in and around the new
mining grounds rights to cultivation were given to black but not whie tenants presumably
because this was seen as a means of retaining mine labour. Thus, in the Benoni district
while Africans were allowed to rent land from the Van Ityn (mining) Company and to
cultivate it for 30 bags of maize or £10 a year per adult male, the secretary of the
local Afrikaner nationalist organization Het Volk complained that 'poor people, who have
stands on tho grounds are not even allowed to make a small garden in front of their homes,
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whereas the natives plant all over the grounds. ' In addition, however, there was one
other reason for land companies giving preference to black rather than white tenants.
The more intensive cultivation of black peasants meant that within a short while veld,
whether grassland or bush, would be cleared and the Value of the land transformed.
The company or the absentee landlord would then be able to offer this land for sale to
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white owners at a much higher price than it would have previously obtained.
The lands owned by missionaries went further towards transforming the relations
of production than either the Boer household or the land companies. Missionaries in
22
the Transvaal, like their contemporaries elsewhere, saw their secular activities
sustaining their spiritual tasks. "Bid en werk" went hand in hand. Moreover, through
evangelical work, one of then told the Commissioner of Native Affairs, "een land voor
beschaving veel beter geopen word als door wagen en krijgsnacht" ("land would be nore
readily opened up for settlenents than through the use of weapons and warfare).
To accomplish their primary function nissionaries had to construct stable
communities, and they took it for granted that such stability required labour froa whose
production goods would go to the narket. This did not mean that they automatically
assumed that such labour had to be sold to others. "Er wordt al al te veel gedacht
dat wanneer een naturel voor zeide selven arbeid het geen werk is naar dan alleen waneer
hi;) voor een write nan arbeid" ("It was all too often Ihought that when a native worked
for himself this was not work and that only when he worked for a white nan waa he -
employed"). So long as labour produced commodities for the narket nissionaries were
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satisfied that they were making progress. In setting peasants to work in ths way they
had one major advantage in an environment which at sone levels was extremely hostile
to nission work. The constitution of the South African Republic forbad the purchase of
land by Africans but custon and convention pomitteo. them to nako such purchases through
an intermediary, an-I the nostcornonintGrnediary was a rdssionary.
Many mission stations, it seens, had been peopled with ex-ifltoekselln/re. In that
event the inhabitants were more amenable to the pressures to confom both because their
choice was reduced - there was no lineage or tribal land to return to - and because
the 3ocial relationships they were now entering were already familiar to then. On the
other hand Alexander Merensky, of the Berlin Missionary Society, and probably tho best
known nissionary in the Transvaal in the second half of the 19th century, thought that
his ultimate goal of mass conversion was nore likely to bo interfere! with If the bulk
of his initial work was undertaken with a declasse group. Merensky therefore rejected
applications fron ex-inboekselin^s for permission to settle on his station but his
colleague and near neighbour Albert Nachtigal was ready to accept ex-captives
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and foraer farn servants. In very uany instances it seeT^ s, however, that tho nission
station was established as a result of an arrangement of convenience between a
nissionary and an African group who already occupied or sought to reoccupy land now
'owned1 by a settlor. While the displaced gioup organised the collection of the
purchase price, the missionary arranged for the sale and the registration of the land in
(V-
his own name since republican law forbad Africans fron buying land on their own account.
The missionaries' power varied fron district to district and station to station. In so^e
cases missionaries had no leverage over "those who lived on their station,
'I regret to say1 wrote the Anglican missionary the Reverend C. Clulee, "that the
chief of the natives in Molote has broken all his prcnises with regard to placing the
baptised and the interests of the church on a favourttuie and satisfactory footing. Ho
is not content with being paramount in authority as regards secular natters, but he holds
us all in such a dependent state as is unworthy of our relative positions, and will
not allow ny converts fron other places to settle on the station except immediately in
the vicinity of his own kraal, or village, which is a violation of his a^reenent with
C
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ne when I first bought -tb© placa at his recjiest1.
In other cases the nissionary had either a political or econonio base tfiich gave
then sone bargaining power with the local settler copnunity and this increased their
capacity to put pressure on those living on the nission station. Thus Merensky's
trading activities neant that his credit with the local bank was in the 1870's
cq
greater than that of the state itself.'* These nissionaries were nen of their
age. They not only bought land on behalf of their converts - or would be converts -
but they were not beyond engaging in land speculation themselves or of converting
the land entrusted to theu to their own or their societies1 purposes and selling land
without consulting the oonuunity which doubly depended on their good faith.
'There are nuuerous Mission Societies working anong the Natives1, the British
Native Commissioner for the Central Division of the Transvaal wrote in 1903, 'but I
cannot say that the latter have been iabued with confidence by the actions of some of
these societies in the past.,..where the natives lived for over 25 years and built
houses, churches and schools upon certain lands which they considered belonging to
the Society, were ordered to pay £12-10 per annun per fanily as rent or leave the
ground. Upon enquiry, it was found -that the land had been disposed of to a Company,
no provision being nade for the 72 Native families who had for so many years regarded
their nissionary as their aivisor,'
In the hey-day of the successful nissionary, in the eighteen sixties and eighteen
seventies, he was as likely to stand between the depredations of a surrounding African
chief don, as those of Boer farmers demanding excessive labour. When chief Mapoch
clained the loyalty of the peasants on the Berlin nission society fam in the Iydenburg
district, their nissionary, Merensky, set his communicants to work to build1 three
strong stone forts '* When there was talk in the white village of Middleburg of
attacking his nission station, Merensky let it be known that if 'any injury whatever was
done to a single hut or house of the station, he would have every house of every Boer
who had been talking so big in Middleburg burnt to the ground and all their property
destroyed1. On another occasion sheep from the station were taken by raiders fron a
neighbouring chief don. When* Merensky received -the news he set off with all the nounted
nen he could collect and since they were nil, armed they were able to retake the sheep
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when they caught up with the rustlers. That Merensky's nen were well arned was no
accident since year after year he had required "the young to go to the distant dianond
103fields to purchase arns. Though Merenslcy nay have been larger than life nissionaries
had an intemediaryposition between those on their stations and Boer society which was
of great political importance. Like the 3oor farcer who protected the tenants on his
land, the nissionary could fend off the tax raid." Nevertheless, the denands of the
missionary were much greater than those of the Boer Turner. In addition to paying
taxes to the state, the peasant nission land tod to pay what Sir Garnet Wolsey
called a "tythe". This went to build and maintain the church and provide.- for
secular education. The missionary, however, required other outlays. Ploughs, new
seed, European clothes, and last but not least the building of the neat symmetrical
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to the specifications of a nostalgic exile's design. This
neant not only selling crops on the narket (virtually every nlsaion station reported
large sales of naize, wheat, uillet, poultry, fruit and wool and it nuat be
renenbered that for nuch of the first decade of the 20th century African peasant
producers were 1he uajor source of local naize) but also employing the new skills of
the blacksnith, carpenter, bricklayer, waggon builder and wheelwright. But once '
nil this effort had been expanded, the nisaion stations' needs were not all net
and nissionary after nissionary reported that the nan of their villages were
constantly away fron the station working for additional incone.
The additional incone was not, however, to cone frca labour sold to
Boer farmers but fr.ci work on tne nines at Johannesburg and Kinbertey and In
service in towns like Pretoria. Not only did the nines pay wages in cash but
because of scarcity they paid relatively high wages. For those who went to work
in the nining canps and towns the church provide! both support and surveillance.
 /-
This was a way cf attenpting to ensure that norals as well as wages remained
inviolate. Thus the Lutheran BapeJi Church require! its youthful connunicants
to return with evidence that they had remained within the churches' juris-
diction while they were away working. '...if a laJ cones back froia work
without a church certificate, he is excluded fron holy coauunion for four tines.1
'Equally important, special euphasis was given to the 'duty of the lads to
support their parents'. Failing to do so night result in their being
exconuunicate:!.
In the long run the nission stations were to collapse as centres of
independent snail peasant production. This was not so nuch because of the
bad faithf of sone nissionarios - to which we have alluded - but rather because
of their general response to the inplenentation of the 1887 Squatters Law. That
law was intended to reduce the nuuber of tenants which a white land owner or >-
occupier could have to five fanilies. The nission societies askel the state to
exenpt then fron its provisions. The state was unwilling to do so although it did
not nove to force the relocation of tenants since it Jid not have the capacity to
do so if only because local officials usually benefitted fron the presence of
nission stations in their districts. A redistribution of nissirm tenants
would, therefore, have neont a loss of labour both for themselves and for
their fellow landlords since they feared that redirected tenants were likely to
1 OR
flee the district. ^  Instead the government pro;josed that uission stations be converted
into 'locations', that is they be treated as if they were conuunallyowDed lands heldon good
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behaviour from the state. Land which had been purchased by its African occupants was no
longer theirs to be realised on the market. Moreover, the state would acquire the
right to determine the amount of land which should be allocated to each household.
The effects of transforming land from mission stations to locations were not to be felt
in the years immediately after the change had taken place. . Ultimately, when the law
came to be enforced by the British administration, the former mission holdings came
more and more toresemble over-crowded tribal reserves,from which labour was regularly
p ropelled.
The 1887 Squatters Law had been introduced soon after the Republic regained its
independence after the first British occupation and it came in response to a populist
demand for a 'dwang' (compulsory) labour latf. The demand came on the whole from,
small farmers with little or no labour and from those, like the Boers of the
Zoutpansberg, who could not gain access to the land which the state's legal title claimed
1OTthey owned. It was, however, difficult for the Boer state to create new legislation to
provide forced labour. The recently agreed to convention with the British had
reiterated the codicil that there should be no slavery and new legislation might provide
the British with the occasion for further intervention even if the cause lay elsewhere.
Nevertheless, there was the need to meet the popular demand from the Boer population.
The result was an anti-squatter law whose explicit purpose w&3 to redistribute African
households. Implicit in the legislation was the belief that this would increase the
amount of labour available to Boer households. Henceforth no landowner could legally
have more than five households on a farm although he was entitled to claim labour for
five farms. In addition, the law conceded the right for this limit of five families to
be exceeded if the landowner could show that these families were necessary for his own
labour requirements. Moreover, any number of white tenants - bywoners - could claim
108five families for their portion of land. Those who sought the law were intent on
forcing labour from company farms, but aa we have seen the legislation
also menaced the missionary lands. Yet the legislation reenaeted in 1895» was, to
begin with, a dismal failure if seen from the perspective of the small landowner and
others without patrons. Theret were several reasons for this. Firstly, just as there
were regions where Boer farmers could not claim their land, let alone the labour of those
who lived on it, so there were regions where they had' established a delicate balance
between obtaining sufficient labour without placing too great a burden on those who
laboured. Disturb this balance and whole districts would be denuded of its peasant
population. This was particularly the view of farmers in the Eastern Transvaal and they
were opposed to the operating of the squatters' law. Similarly, within each district
there were some whose labour needs were being met but who feared that if a redistribution
of peasant households took place there would be a geno**ol exodus. As the Secretary of
Natives despondently observed in 1897, "if a burgher really wants to use his servants as
such, then wanderlust speedily shows itself and it is not long before such a farmer sits
without assistance, or has to carry more kaffir-tenants11 than is legal. Since the Boer
households most satisfied were generally the households of notables with political office,
the will to enforce the law was generally absent. But if there was an unwillingness to
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enforce the law locally, there was an equal reluctance at the centre. This was not only,
as Paul Kruger put it, because 'Ouma (grandmother, i.e. Queen Victoria) was watching1
but because there was a genuine fear that precipitate action by some enthusiastic veld
kornet. commandant,or native commissioner would lead to a full scale war. The
Squatters' Law had, therefore, limits placed on local initiative and required all
decisions to redistribute households to be agreed to in advance by the Superintendent
of Native Affairs in Pretoria. This was a degree of centralisation which was extremely
unusual in the South African Republic. The result was that anti-squatting legislation made
very little impact unless there was an already existing capacity to compel labour tc rfork.
There was one remaining area from which Boer households might have obtained
labour. In addition to the land occupied by autonomous groups and conceded as being
African owned (even if ultimately it was said to be held in trust by the state) there
was a vast amount of land claimed by the state which went unaurveyed. Those occupying
this land were not given any form of statutory recognition and in 1891 the Volksraad (
instructed the executive to deny them continued access to this land. They might
as well have claimed the right for burghers to have two 6,000 morgen farms on the Moon.
The VolkBraad was not, however, put off by the impossible and in 1895 it reminded the
executive of its earlier resolution. The executive was again instructed to implement
the resolution out it was now told that it should now do so only as far as (was)
practicable1. This was followed in 1896 and 1897 by commissions to investigate the
failure to implement the resolution. Again in 1897 the Superintendent of Native Affairs
issued instructions that the Volksraads resolution be carried ou+. Again to no effect.
Finally the Superintendent acknowledged defeat.
'...not withstanding my repeated instructions to carry out *the Resolution,
various Native Cocmissioners have unanimously given me to understand that in
districts where there are many natives on Government land, it is impossible to
comply therewith f
Again, however, it would be wrong to measure policy solely Tby its lack of efficacy v
before the war. Even .if the settler state found it difflta It to prize loose labour during
the republican period, it was preparing the ground for the success that was to follow
after the war under a British administration. Throughout the eighties and nineties
•location' commissions were defining and redefining the boundaries of land occupied by
African groups who continued to exist on a semi-autonomous basis after -tteir conquest.
The crucial action of republican officials was to limit the totaH amount of land available
to each household within the jurisdiction of a given chief. Though it may often have been
difficult or even impossible to enforce ttiese limitations before the South African War,
boundaries were demarcated which the British colonial state and in.ts successor would
ultimately be able to make effective. Thus groups of households!:, already limited to poor
grazing and arable holdings would be prevented - except for some limited opportunities
for renting l^nd - f^om expanding as their populations grew. Ttihe effects of this
limitation wculd only be felt in the twenty years after 1900. E". ut in the immediate
aftermath of war Godfrey Lagden could, after some reflection on CCIronje's impotence
write: 'With the law on their side, the power to carry it out, aonid the well known desire
to distribute labour in such a way that agricultural interests miilght derive the benefit
of it, for which, indeej. thev were_LLLwaY_s_clnnouT-inD- +h& nniv no-:Wmn+inn in that the
difficulties and complications were such as to prohibit the application of the law1,110
In between Cronje's despairing conclusions and lagden 'a reflections had come the
cataclysmic events of the war. Landlords, already weak, lost their capacity to get
their tenants to work for them. But more than this, they were everywhere faced with -
local rebellions, actual or in prospect. Reports from districts as far apart as . .
Soulsport In the south-west, Waterberg in the north-west, Zoutpansberg in the north,
Pretoria and Heidelberg in the south and Vryheid in the south-east revealed that .
Africans were convinced that "foe military defeat of the Boers would have them in .
possession of those farms which the Boers had occupied before the war. They had seen Boe."
homesteads destroyed, adult males taken prisoner of war, women and children rounded up and
held in concentration camps and they themselves had been encouraged (if they needed
encouraging) to seize Boer stock. Thus the Bakhatla ' claimed by right of conquest f
the whole of the country from the Crocodile to the Elands River". It was generally
understood amongst themselves (that) no Boer would be allowed to cross the Elands River.
It was widely believed that whatever their previous commitments to their landlords had
been it was the government's intention to free them of these and thereafter to subdivide
Boer farms and to give them out to African tenants .vho would then rent them from the state.
In the Zouthansberg where it was believed that tii* Boers would not return Africans moved
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their homesteads and established new gardens onlb&fMand, When Louis Botha, the former
Commandant General of the Republican forces, returned to his farm in the Vryheid district,
he was run off his own land, ' My Kaffirs told me I had no business there, and I had
114better leave.1 As late as 1907 one Vryheid farmer reported that he had had ' a lot of
trouble with the natives since the war; they were disobedient and did not want to work.
Before the war he had no trouble; they were all obedient and w>rked well. When
he came back to his farm after the war they did not turn up when called upon, and
.when they did come "they came armed. They did not greet the witness in the way they
formerly did. When witness asked them >hose boys they were, they said "they did not know.
v- When they were asked on viiose farm they lived, they said -they did not know. Time, they
said, would show. They were told it was -the farm of the witness, and that if they did
not work they would have to go away. They refused; they said they would stay where they
were. For eighteen months after the war witness had no natives in his service.
Since then things had never been rectified; the natives worked just as they liked.
When they were called upon they put forward excuses; some, they said, were at school,
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others were sick.
For the most part, however, tenancies seem to have been re-established relatively soon
after the war in part because of the threat of the use of force by the British, and in
part because the Boers were allowed to remain under arms until most Africans were disarmed.
In addition memories of Boer resurgence after the lac+ British occupation had ended
in 1881, made the Africans reluctant to take advantage c£ the weakened landlord. Moreover,
the reintroduction of tax oollecting and labour recruiting made chiefs more willing to
collaborate once acre.
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At the same time we should remember that the major preoccupation of the incoming
administration was to return the gold mines to their pre-war productivity and thereafter
to create the conditions which would improve upon that productivity. The renewed call
for the implementation of anti-squat ting legislation was therefor© unable to gain support in
official quarters although the new Secretary of State for Native Affairs, Lagden did
propose that it be implemented in selected districts. The fear was that if anti-
squatting legislation was enforced in the districts of Zoutpansberg, Waterberg, Lydenburg.
and Barberton, there might be a further exodus of thoa who provided periodic labour for th .
colony .and who moreover produced 'a considerable amount of cereals, especially mealies used
for consumption in "this country'. For the moment, at least, there could be no decision
to support Boer rather than African production but the inaction of the new administration,
particularly when it was combined on the one hand with a disposition in the rhetoric of tht •
new ruling class to favour wage labour and cash tenancies, as well as the various measures
aimed at weakening the class power of the notables might have created the "belief that
African market production was being given preference.
In the decade before 1900 black peasant production contributed a substantial part of
the locally grown crops which found their way to, the markets of the Transvaal, The extent
of this market oriented production has been noted by Kruger, Bvndy and Denoon among others.
It comes as no surprise therefore, to discover that a 'merchant of Pretoria1 could tell the
Standard and Diggers News that after 'careful computation of the market books' he had
concluded that 'Kafirs take away £47,000 from the local market for every £26,000 taken away
11Qby Boers'. 7A year or two earlier 1he naturalist Bleloch had reported that Africans grew
immense quantities of maize 'for their own consumption and for stle to the mines to feed
120their brothers at work there1. Immediately after the war Owen Thomas made sfcilar
observations. "The native1 he wrote 'grew a very large proportion of the mealie crop and
1?1
would grow much more if they had better facilities for marketing it1. This production
was called for because African peasants had to pay rent or taxes, or because they had to
purchase commodities required of them by improving landlords or by missionaries, or because v.
they felt the need for these commodities themselves. IfTnay be that in this respect tiie
black petty producer had a greater need for a cashincome than the small Afrikaner
cultivator. This in its turn may have been the reason for the phenomenon which the
Johannesburg Star claimed to observe1.
'The average Dutch farmer1, the Star wrote, 'grows a certain amount with the object of
making a certain profit. If prices decline, he tries to produce a little more aid still
obtain his fixed minimum. If prices appreciate, he takes a little less trouble, and grows
1 ??
a little less, still pocketing the same profit'.
Two hundred years after their initial settlement, therefore, households were still
turning in on "themselves, still only producing as much as was needed to acquire a socially
necessary income. Like their predecessors "they were caught either in a spiral of
increasing debts or of increasing impoverishment.
The majority of Afrikaner producers whether large landlords or small tenant
cultivators, were content to acquire their incomes, either from pastoral activities
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or from a variety of route* Some farmers had long grown tobacco and orchards provided
the ingredients for locally distilled brandies or for dried fruit which were sold on a •
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wide scale. Tobacco in particular was exchanged for cattle in an earlier period.
The disasters of both rinderpest and war and forced Afrikaners to look to new forms of
cultivation for an increased source of income. Increased cultivation might be under-
taken by tenants from who increased rents were now being asked* But in order that their
own income remained constant tenmts had to ensure tiiat their own disposable surplus
was not decreased by the increase in rent. The stepping up of production in this way
assucred, however, that the markets of the Transvaal could take as much as was offered
to them. At first sight this should have been 00. Were there not constant complaints
about -the shortages of food on, the markets of the mining towns and of the high prices
124 SBortages
which shortages created? /there may have been but these did not ensure that crops sold or;
the market would realise a profit. Owen Thomsa, drew attention to the problems created"
by the uncertainty of markets. ' I interrogated every farmer whom I met as to why he
did not grow mealies: they invariably responded that if they did the price would be too
low - they had tried it:- when they were successful other fanners were also successful;
and an abundant crop all over "the district forced down the price of mealies to as low
as 3/6d a bag. This statement was borne out by farmers not only in the Transvaal, but
also in the Froo State.1 J
These observations give a certain force to the probably apocraphyl report of the
Afrikaner tenant who, during the war, sold 30 bags of maize to a British army store.
A British officer having paid hin 20sh a bag then asked:
'Have you ever received so much for your medies before, Johannes? No? Well then
I suppose that now you see what a lot of money 30 bags bring you will go hone and double
1 Pftthe area which you have cultivated this year?1
•Na Sir: but only half the farner replied, 'Everybody will grow more mealies next
year; and there will "be no price or market for then',
Thomas' view was that the Transvaal market required 800,000 bogs of naize and peasant
production was already sufficient to meet this requirement. The saae, he thought, was
true of other crops. Although th^ ere were only a small number of the possible producers
supplying the Johannesburg market in January 1903, (drought and war destruction having
held back the majority) there was already a serious problem of overproduction.
' At the present nonent (January 1903) only a small proportion of the Transvaal farmers
are able to supply produce. Yet I W e been informed by the market-master of Johannesburg
that at the present tine some farmers sell their produce on the market at less than the
cost of transport, to say nothing of the cost of production of which a free gift is thus
nade to the fortunate buyer. The daily returns of the produce market clearly show that
the supply is already equal to the demand, and that tho price obtained is, in uany cases,
below the cost of production and marketing charges1.
With markets so unpredictable tho producer was invariably thrown back upon tho local
trader. But the trader was part of the probleu. Thomas found as he travelled through
the Transvaal that he could buy caize from African producers at between i/- and io/- a b£^
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but that store purchased maize would be as high as 45/-. One storekeeper had told
Thomas, that the goods he exchanged (e.g, blankets) for bags of maize were generally
1 ?ft
valued at l/- or l/6d. Afrikaner farcers were alao caught in this trap of high prices
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for the goods they purchased and low prices for the produce which they aold. Sinilarly,
both the Boer faraer and the African peasant were caught in a debt trap produced by the
uncertainty of rural production. Where debts forced African producers to sell
their labour power through the trader who was also a labour recruiter, the Boer fomer
was not conpelled by the tax systen to earn cash wages, and instead, provided his land
as surety, John Hobson, whose sense of conspiracy coloured his otherwise astute, econonic
analysis, thought that Boer farmers were mortgaging their fams to an organised Jewish
syndicate. "I an infomed" he wrote ''that a very large proportion of the Transvaal formers
are as entirely in the hands of Jewish money-lenders as is -the Russian uoujik or -tile Au3tri:'
peasant." Jewish noneylenders were only the nost recent wave of creditors to attach
themselves to the farmers of the Transvaal, but whatever the source of the credit there
is no doubt that there was a considerable increase in the amount of indebtedness in the
Transvaal in the years incedlately before 1899. In 3.896 alone mortgages increased
by £4,874,000. At the sane time the state had established its own fomi of credit (including
£250,000 from on amortisation fund which was intended for poor burghers) and had given out
loans valued at £750,000. The bulk of these loans, since thej- were provided fron the Post
Office Savings 3onk and the Orphan Chamber had, therefore,to be held against realisable
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assets.
Prior to the war Afrikaner farmers night undertake arable productior for the market but
only as a secondary source of incone. With the destruction of their stock ttiey were now
forced to rely to a far greater extent than before on the sale of crops. The vagaries
of the market must, therefore, have become nore intolerable than ever. But how could
greater stability be achieved? Thirty years later when political circumstances pemitted,
•the state was to intervene to provide support prices for agricultural producers. But in
the years immediately after the South African War with state power lost and the Boer
notables under threat as a class, no such alternative existed. An alternative to a
support price would have been to linit Tricon competition by reducing the surplus
production of these peasants. Such a strategy would have tiie advantage of increasing
tfie labour supply as peasants became proletarians. But this strategy would also take a
long time to work and in the neantime the rural white population of small and nediun
farmers would themselves bo reduced to penury by poor harvests mnd rapacious money
lenders. What was needed was a facility whose effects would b? immediate. A system
of credit which would free farmers from the existing commercial ties would have an
imnediate effect. But how could this bo brought into existence?? We have already
noted 1he failure of earlier attempts on the part of the notables to free themselves
from the existing systems of merchant credit. This failure had taken place even though
the notables had created a state to serve their own interests. Now with thib state
taken from them, the prospects of throwing of ihe merchantile incubus must have been even
less. And yet before the first decade of the 20th century was ccoapleted, those who
now controlled the state had created the basis for an alternative system of credit. This
would tltinately free those fanners, who were to becoue the large connercial producers
of the Transvaal, fron a dependerce on nerchant capital. Seen fron the perspective of
the war's end , this outcone ia doubly unexpected. Not only had the dominant forces in
society lost control of the state - and with it easy access to the spoils which their
offices could help then extract fron the mining industry, as well as iixeir control over
labour - but the new colonial state seened determined to undemine the capacity
of the notables to dominate the rural Afrikaner population. The strategies which the
state set itself are well known. Firstly, two different land settlenent schenes were to
be introduced. One would bring a class of 'yeoman1 British famers who would displace
the Boer notables as the prinary economic force in the countryside. (While we do not
doubt the prinacy of ideological and political intentions of this proposal, it appears
that it also suited the needs of the land conpaniea who could now look forward to
(:..: unloading large tracts of land on to the narket.)
The second land settlenent schene was intended to create alternative tenancies for
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poor cncl landless Afrikaners uolcing then 'Bijwoners of the State1. This was ccnbined with
educational-cun-languago policies whose purpose wa3 to clivest the notables, and their
clerical compatriots, of their links with their clients and dependents.
This was an onbitious, probably inpossible, progranoe of social engineering and would
have required vast resources if it were to succeed without further violence and coercion.
But these resources were not available. Moreover disruptions in the countryside were
creating problens for the mining industry and the mining industry v&s the prinary concern
of the new state.
The attempt to undemine the notables, though it was to fail, coincided with their
attempt to transform themselves fron pastoral to arable producers. This probably hastened
£ the already deteriorating relationships between Afrikaner landlords and their bywoner
tenants. The deterioration of these relationships had -begun before the war but in the
post-war period the obligations of these relationships became nore and more difficult to
fulfil. At the very least bvwoners now became an obstacle to crop production.
This was not because the land tfiich bywoners night wish to graze cattle on could be
transformed into arable land, but because African tenants who were more likely to provide
labour, could only be attracted to the land if -tiiey could find sufficient grazing for their
own stock. But even where the bvwoner was a cultivator and paid a share of his crops as
rent, the breakdown of customary relationships led landlords - having themselves to sell
nore and nore on a fickle market - to atteapt to increase their rent. 'I have heard a
bvwoner complain' the Transvaal Ihdigency Commission was told 'that it rould not pay then
to grow more than 300 bags of mealies on account of the demand from the Gwners for
133increased rates and shares of the produce.
The result was a stream of landless Afrikaans-speaking peasants without any neans of
subsistence who were compelled to move to the towns. In the post-war period the towns
nost likely to provide thorn with a living were those which had grown up around the gold
nines. These mines were, by their owners' reckoning, suffering fron an acute shortage
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of unskilled labour. Nevertheless, they were unwilling to enploy these landless
Afrikaners. The orthodox reason offered for this unwillingness was that these
Afrikaner poor, having themselves been the employers of servile labour, were ... .
unsuitable for the arduous tasks of an underground worker. This explanation is
unsatisfactory since we have already seen that many of "the rural poor had undertaken
their own field-work. A sinilar explanation rests on the supposed innate inability
of these white poor to neet the needs of the mining industry. An explanation so
explicitly racist hardly need detain us, particularly as these same men,were a
decade later, to undertake the tasks of forauan ganger without their supposed innate
inabilities standing in their way.
It was 1helr landlessness which node these Afrikaans—speaking poor
unacceptable to the mining employers. The wage they required nust provide not only
for their own subsistence but also for their families subsistence and reproduction. (
Such wages would increase the cost of labour power and reduce goldmining profitsV^
Equally, not to employ thea would have left the towns with a dangerous and disaffected
population1 the bulk of the poorer agriculturists1 wrote Lord Selborne who had now
replaced Milner as High Commissioner, 'are drifting to the towns, helping to swell the
ranks of the unemployed, adding to the class of "poor white", breeding apathy, squalor,
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crine and discontent.1 At the same tine tiie poverty which forced tenants and poor
farmers off the land, also hold the najority of the rural population in its grip.
The state's attempt, therefore, to undermine the power of the notables forced the
former re;3ublican political leaders - and the clergy - to act in cheir own defence.
In this way they came to give direction to existing rural discontent.
Rural impoverishment and imperial intervention coincided with the Report of the
Transvaal Labour Commission which concluded that there was insufficient labour in
Southern Africa for the goldmines. Both the state and mining employees accepted this
conclusion which had vital consequences for those seeking agricultural labour. This
appraisal meant that neither "the state nor mining employees would, for the moment,
attempt to squeeze labour from within the region- Hence agricultural employers, who
were too weak to exert pressure on their own must expect to face a shortage of
labour. Cumulatively, therefore, land settlement, language and labour policies combined
with the state's apparent indifference to the competition which black agricultural
producers constituted, spurred notables to reconstitute their dormant political networks.
This led directly to the creation of the Afrikaner populist party, Het Volk. ^  ^
Lord Selborne, who after all, had been a Conservative Cabinet Minister, and had been
sent to South Africa because of his political acumen, was better able "than Milner
to distinguish botween first and second order political problems. In the reordering
of the Transvaal the establishment of the pre-eminence of mining capital was 1he
essential task of the new administration. Any decision about the countryside must be
subordinate to this first priority. Milner thought that both economic and political
priorities would best be served by establishing a capitalist agriculture. Selborne,
more pragmatic than Milner, nni with the hindsight of Milner's failures, sought a less
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aynr.i»*ri«va nniutlon. Ho irould secure the countryside by revitalising rather than
dismantling its class structure:
•In the nind of the average Boer Farner1, Selbome wrote 'the only function of the
Government is to safeguard and foster his material prosperity, and if once convinced
that the existing Government fllfils that function, he will probably support it as
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readily as he would a purely Boer Governnent fron which he derived less practical help'.
Under Selborne's . direction uuch now turned on restoring the welfare of the
agricultural econony. 'Until that industry energes fron its present deplorable
condition the TransveAl cannot really be prosperous, nor will the .enbers cf political
unrest cease to snoulder 'dangerously1. Once prosperity in the countryside had been
achieved, then Afrikaner peasants could be restored to the land and the tide, of what
Lord .Selbourne called 'indigent humanity1," would be turned. In this way the prinary
objective of safeguarding the interests of Dining would be achieved. For Selbourne,
therefore, a Land Bank, providing credit and other financial supports for agriculture
was a proposal of 'immense political inportance' and a tieans of 'binding the oass of
the fanning conuunity to the Governuent'. ..
The initiative for setting up the Land Bank was, therefore, taken by the British
administration before the Transvaal becane a self-governing colony. The Bank was
brought into being after the colony liad becone self-governing but it received a
£2 uillion loan from Britain. The populist denand that it provide credit for the poorest
of the whte rural population was not to prevail. Equally unsurprising, its credit
went only to those who had, at least in theory, realisable assets. • The poorest of the
landowners and bywoners and tenants wero excluded fron its facilities. At the sane time
landlords uade it clear to the Land Bank Connission that they would not stand surety for *
their tenants. It was, of course, white tenants that the landlords deuurred at
supporting African tenants and landowners were not considered as potential recipients of
credit.159 . . .
As a result Het Volk which seened so threatening in 1905, was by 1908, a willing
nenber of the alliance of gold and naize. This support given to the naize fanners of
the Transvaal created a new sot of complications. If the Land Bank assisted soue it
did so at the expense of others. Fron its very beginning its,effect was to^iserininate
in other parts of South Tirrxca
in the marketplace, nut sinply against black farners, but against white f a m e i ^
not qualify for its support. That they did nut qualify night have been the result of
their poverty and lack of property. It night alsD have been that because they farmed
outside the Transvaal they were not eligible for its facilities. The Land Lank
assisted in creating a Maize Agency :vhich enabled newly established marketing?
cooperatives to gain the custoa of the uajor South African purchaser of naize, the
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Transvaal Chauber of Mines. Because the Maize Agency, established in 1909, found itself
in competition with large 'produce* uerchants, it could only ensure sales by tendering
lower prices than its competitors. At the sano tine the Chauber sought, and received
a guarantee that the c jo^eratives woull supply tho quantities that it required. The
effect of this intervention was to stabilise prices but at the cost of re-luciiig then.
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Instead of prices being low at the beginning of the season and high at its end, they were
now equally low throughout the year. In 1913 prices on the Johannesburg rarket were
lower at the und of the season than they had been at its beginning. This neant that
other uaize producers, nost prominently the larger white farner3 of "the Orange Tree
State, as well aa African peasants were excluded frou dealing with the largest purchaser
of uaize but in addition the price of uaize was depressel by an institution which
continued to be Transvaal oriented even after the four British colonies had b een
brought together in a South African Union in 1910. The political Inplications
of this situation were to be far reaching but WG need not explore then now.
The effect of "the already United narket being skewed by the differential inter-
vention of state credit meant that white farners tod to find alternative ways of nain-
taining their incone, fiver since the end of the war White farriers had seen the
limiting of African production, as well aa the increase of "their own, as ueans of
achieving this end. 3ut even before ttio creation of the Land Bank the Transvaal
Suprene Court had decided that Africans coald not be prevented fron purchasing
land and this had created widespread disuay aoong white farriers. In practice the
right to x">urchaso land had always existed (albeit the land had to be held through an
interuediary), but the cart's decision was seen both as an immediate coonercial
threat as well as being contrary to the needs of a long teru labour policy which the
state was beginning to evolve with the 1905 Rtrpsrt of tho South African Native Affairs
Ccnnission. Because they felt threatened by black producers, white farcers sought
to prohibit land purchases by black peasants.
'It is beyond argument' the'Transvaal Land Owners Association contended in its
1906 Annual Report, 'that white settlers cannot coupete against natives who own land
alongside then, any acre than white traders can conpete with coolies on sinilar
conditions. Traders have spoken with nj uncertain voice on 1iii3 subject, and settlers
on the land nust also protect ttieiiiselves. It is such a self evident proposition that
it needs hardly be enlarged upon. The native utilisee-wonen and children in his
production .(neither:) Mixed education nor the requireuents of civilisation figure in
his cost sheet. How then can the white settlers grow either crops or stock against
H3
such a conpetitor1. *
In order, therefore, to put an end to this coupetition between peasant producers
and white landowners, the newly elected Hot Yolk Oovernnent of the Transvaal sot about
reversing the court decision to pernit a free tiarket in land. In spite of having a
uajority in favour of such legislation the Het Volk Governaent was pursuaded by the
coabined reluctance of the British High Counissioner and the largely mining oriented
Opposition to stay its hand. Instead, it decided to enforce ttie Squatters Law,
which though suspended, was still on tho statute book. But tho purpose of those
responsible for reactivating the Plakkers Wot differed fron those whose agitation
had uade it necessary that the Volksraad/enact legislation in 1887 and 1895.
Previously, as we have seen, legislation was intended to serve the soall landowner or
occupier's needs for labour. Now the Squatters' Law acquired the priuary purpose o f
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'helping the large landowner eliminate peasant competition by reducing "Hie nuuber of
faailies renting land fron conpanies or absentoo landlords. This in its turn had the
additional effect of increasing the nunbor of peasants having to seek new tenancies at
nuch increased (usually labour) rents, and making available the wonen and children who
had previously been confined to the houestoad econony. Tribute and other relationships
had, of course, brought wonen and children to work on settler fams, but the relative
waning of settler power nay have decreased ttieir ability to call out this labour. In
any event as conuercial faming began to take root so the call for the labour of
wouen and children becane stronger.
'We prefer wonon for sone work'. Dicke told the Transvaal Labour Commission.
'They are cheaper and they do just the sane work. For instance when plucking tobacco,
or reaping nealies, it is immaterial whether the hands enployed belong t) a child or a
wouan. It is not hard labour. We want nen only to take out the stunps of trees;
for other work we use machinery there,1'^
(\,. . The Squatters law did n:jt, therefore, provide labour for the white cultivator with a
United access to land. On tho contrary it reinforced the existing distribution of
labour. The srjall white faruer with a United nunber of tenants or labourers had, a3
wo have suggested, to set his hands to work nore frequently than the largo landowner who
could acc-xiuodate uany uore tenants* This nade the large landowner the lesser of two
evils to the peasant seeking either a tenancy or enployiJent. This 'preference' which
black tenant's showed, then gave ideological support to aduinistrators who chose to
leave labour with tho large landowners.
'Many f.o.mers1, wrote the Sub-Native Counissioner for %lstroonf 'uore especially
those of the class whose unpopularity with the natives is not without
Justification, hoped for a general shuffling of native squatters by the
Governuent, unler which farn labourers were to be settled, willy-nilly, by the
sub-connissioners on their farus.
Keen disappointment becane apparent anongst this class of farner when they
s-.. found that they were no better off for labour than before, and that their uoro
v* fortunate neighbours,having proved to the satisfaction of the ninister for Native
/iffairs that their agricultural operations requiredJthe services of all, if not
nore than the nunber of natives already resident on their farms, were allowed to
retain considerably nore than five squatters'. 145
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The relationships between large landowners and their tenants, whether black or white,
were by 1910, locked into a pattern which would enable tte landlord to preside over the
ever increasing connercialisation of agriculture. In tine that agriculture would be trans—
fomed beyond nere connercial response. The growing landlessness of both peasantries
fostered the accumulation of landed capital by the notables. At the sane tine the increasing
rents deaancted of teiionts added to the surplus product taken by landowners. In addition
the first trickle of state credit and subsidy signalled a reduction of the hold which
conuercial capital had on landlords. Equally the depressing effect which these subsidies
and credits had on nnrket prices reduced the capacity of black and white peasants to compete
with c.irxierciolly oriented farriers. In all the oto-jo was sot for tho creation of n
capitalist agriculture. Yet few would be surprised tiiat the actors took sone tine before
"they accepted their cues to coL'.e on stnfjo.
